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COMMENTS
CIRCUIT CITY MEETS THE CALIFORNIA LABOR
COMMISSIONER: DOES THE FAA PREEMPT
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Carlos' was a day laborer, standing on a busy street comer in southern
California.2 When a man pulled up in his car and asked him if he wanted
work as a janitor, he quickly agreed and jumped in. The day job turned into
something more permanent: Carlos worked for that employer for three years.
However, the employer never paid him overtime, despite the fact that Carlos
regularly worked nine and ten-hour days. After Carlos was laid off, he heard
that he could file a claim with the California Labor Commission for the
overtime pay he should have received. He filed the claim, and appeared for a
pre-hearing conference at the Labor Commission. At the conference, the
Deputy Commissioner informed the employer that he had violated the Cali-
fornia Labor Code by not paying overtime, and that if he went forward to a
hearing, he risked being ordered to pay the full amount of back wages due
plus statutory penalties and interest. The employer consulted with his attor-
ney and after several rounds of negotiation, he and Carlos agreed to a settle-
ment. Carlos received a check for $9,000. The entire process had taken only
three months and had cost Carlos nothing but his time. His statutory rights
were enforced, and both he and the employer could move on with their lives.
The employer was now on notice regarding his statutory obligation to pay
overtime, and while he had to pay Carlos and his own attorney, the costs
were minimal when compared to a court proceeding.3
1. Carlos is not his real name, but his story is based on an actual case brought before the
California Labor Commission in 2003.
2. In many communities of southern California, Hispanic men wait on street corners to
be picked up for day labor. Employers drive up, let them know what they need, and one or
more men hop into the car.
3. Both parties may represent themselves or have counsel. Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement, Policies and Procedures for Wage Claim Processing, at www.dir.ca.
gov/dlselPolicies.htm (last revised May 2001). In many cases, the workers are represented by
public interest organizations such as Legal Aid Society, California Rural Legal Assistance, or
the Employee Rights Center. Employers typically have private counsel. Telephone Interview
with Michael Jackman, Counsel, California Labor Commission (Aug. 4, 2003).
1
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When non-union workers' in California have a dispute with their em-
ployer over wages, hours or related issues, the Department of Labor Stan-
dards Enforcement (DLSE) (also referred to as the Labor Commission) pro-
vides a powerful resource to protect their rights under the California Labor
Code.' After receiving a claim from a worker, the Labor Commission holds a
pre-hearing conference, in an attempt to settle the dispute informally.6 If the
parties cannot reach a settlement, they proceed to an administrative hearing,
where a Deputy Labor Commissioner determines the validity of the worker's
claim.7 If the Commissioner finds the employer liable for Labor Code viola-
tions, he can award back pay, penalties and interest to the employee! Work-
ers can also bring certain discrimination claims to the Labor Commission
and the agency will investigate those claims and issue a decision.9 In both
cases, decisions of the Labor Commission are binding, subject to appeal in
Superior Court, and if the employer does not comply with a finding against
him, the Labor Commissioner can proceed to court to have it enforced."
What if Carlos had signed an employment agreement with a mandatory
arbitration clause?" Would he still have been able to pursue his claim before
the Labor Commission? Should he be able to? Many employers today re-
quire new employees to sign mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition of
employment, in order to avoid the costs of litigation. 2 Does a worker who
signs such an agreement waive his right to take a claim, not just to court, but
4. The Labor Commission handles primarily claims by non-union workers. However, if a
union worker has a claim that is not covered by the collective bargaining agreement, he may
file with the Labor Commissioner as well. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (when
employer refused to pay a unionized employee promptly on her discharge, she was free to
bring a claim to the Labor Commissioner because the collective bargaining agreement was
irrelevant to the dispute at hand).
5. CAL. LAB. CODE § 79-107 (West 2003).
6. LEGAL AID Soc'Y EMP. LAW CTR., WAGE CLAIMs: A GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 56
(2001).
7. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98 (West 2003).
8. Id. §§ 98.1, 203, 558.
9. Id. §§ 98.6-98.7. "Any person who believes that he or she has been discharged or oth-
erwise discriminated against in violation of any law under the jurisdiction of the Labor Com-
missioner may file a complaint with the division within six months after the occurrence of the
violation." Id. § 98.7(a). Examples include discrimination or discharge for filing or threaten-
ing to file a claim with the Labor Commissioner, id. § 98.6(c)(1); taking time off to seek relief
from domestic violence, id. § 230(c); engaging in political activity of the employee's choice,
id. §§ 1101, 1102; complaining about safety or health practices, id. § 6310; or refusing to
work hours in excess of those permitted by law, id. § 1198.3(b).
10. Id. § 98.2.
11. It is probably unlikely that a day laborer would be presented with such a contract, but
many low wage workers at least fill out an application, which may contain an arbitration
agreement.
12. It is estimated that eight to ten percent of U.S. workers are currently covered by arbi-
tration agreements. Eighty-five percent of those have been created since 1991. Laura Kaplan
Plourde, Comment, Analysis of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams in Light of Previous Su-
preme Court Decisions: an Inconsistent Interpretation of the Scope and Exemption Provisions
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 145, 172 (2003).
[Vol. 40
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to the Labor Commission as well? This Comment explores these questions
in light of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. This is an especially contentious and unsettled area
of law in California. This Comment examines recent California cases and
developing legal theories bearing on the right of workers to take statutory
claims to the Labor Commissioner (or to court) when they have signed arbi-
tration agreements with their employer. The Comment argues that while em-
ployers are often defeated in their attempts to compel workers to arbitrate,
the process is time-consuming, costly and unpredictable; resulting in waste-
ful litigation and uncertainty for employers and workers alike.
Part II describes the background of the current debate, including a brief
history of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 3 and Supreme Court decisions
that have expanded its scope in recent years to cover statutory employment
claims brought by most employees. Part H also summarizes the arguments
made by the proponents and opponents of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts.
Part Ill discusses the law as it has developed in California since two wa-
tershed U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Circuit City v. Adams 4 and EEOC v.
Waffle House.5 This part explores the California (and Ninth Circuit) courts'
approach to arbitration clauses in employment contracts. It focuses on the
California Supreme Court's guidelines for evaluating arbitration clauses, laid
down in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc." and the
case law that applied those guidelines. It discusses the position of the Cali-
fornia Labor Commissioner on its jurisdiction where an arbitration clause
exists. In addition to Labor Commission cases, Part I looks at the fate of
statutory employment claims in the California courts as well.
Part IV argues that because of the unsettled nature of the law in Califor-
nia, workers' rights to pursue a claim with the Labor Commissioner or in
court are decided on a case-by-case basis. As a result, both employers and
employees are uncertain as to the scope of an arbitration clause. This leads to
increased litigation and a weakening of the effectiveness of workers' statu-
tory rights. These outcomes undermine important policy goals of efficiency,
consistency and fairness in the legal system. This is particularly true when
workers are prevented from taking claims to the Labor Commission, which
provides an efficient, low cost method of dispute resolution. Part IV dis-
cusses a new legal theory being developed by Labor Commission attorneys,
which attempts to resolve the current dilemma by arguing for a new interpre-
tation of the scope of the FAA: that the FAA does not cover administrative
proceedings.
13. 9 U.S.C.A. (1999 & Supp. 2003).
14. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
15. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
16. 6 P.3d 669 (2000).
3
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Part V concludes with a discussion of possible solutions to the problem,
including the Labor Commission attorneys' approach. This part assesses the
promise and limitations of their argument, as well as other possibilities. Ul-
timately, the Comment concludes that the FAA should not preempt adminis-
trative claims by workers, but that without Congressional action, a satisfac-
tory solution is unlikely.
II. BACKGROUND
In recent years, increasing numbers of employers have made use of
mandatory arbitration clauses in job applications and employment con-
tracts.' They are mandatory in the sense that they must be signed as a condi-
tion of employment, and if a dispute arises between employer and employee
it must be resolved by binding arbitration, rather than in court." Arbitration
is a faster and less formal process than litigation."9 The parties are not re-
quired to adhere to procedural and evidentiary rules, and judicial review is
quite limited." To understand the increase in mandatory arbitration clauses
in employment contracts, it is necessary to look at the history of arbitration
in the United States, focusing in particular on the FAA.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act, which gave arbi-
tration agreements the same legal standing as any contract." Merchants and
trade associations since colonial times had used arbitration, because it pro-
vided a relatively fast, informal, private and inexpensive means of dispute
resolution. However, English and American common law had always been
hostile to arbitration, and Congress intended to change that. Its goal was to
create a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 3 The FAA
states that "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
17. See supra note 12.
18. Mandatory arbitration can be distinguished from voluntary arbitration, in which, once
a dispute arises, the parties can mutually agree to arbitration. Voluntary arbitration is beyond
the scope of this Comment, except to note that many of the critics of mandatory arbitration
advocate voluntary arbitration as an alternative. See Michael Rubin, Point Counterpoint: Vol-
untary ADR is Preferable to Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Which are Sure to Result in
More Litigation, California Bar Journal, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/0lmayl
page l0-1.htm (May 2001).
19. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 546-48 (2000).
20. Id.
21. Brandon L. Peak, Note, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.: Employers Beware-the EEOC
is Now the "Master of its own Case," 54 MERCER L. REv. 1235, 1238 (2003).
22. Id. at 1237.
23. Id. at 1238 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
386 [Vol. 40
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tion ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity."' Section 3 of the FAA provides that when par-
ties have a written arbitration agreement, one of the parties can stay a judi-
cial proceeding over a dispute covered by that agreement."
For decades after the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme Court inter-
preted it narrowly. It was held to apply only to admiralty cases or commerce
cases brought in federal court based on federal question or diversity jurisdic-
tion.26 In addition, the Court was hostile to the FAA in cases where federal
statutes were involved.17 However, in the 1980s, "the FAA was virtually re-
written by the Supreme Court, ushering in a new era in arbitration law."'28 In
a series of cases, the Court held that: 1) the FAA applies in state as well as
federal courts and preempts conflicting state law;29 2) the FAA establishes a
presumption of arbitrability, i.e., "as a matter of federal law, any doubts con-
ceming the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion;"" and 3) the FAA applies to statutory claims.3
Employment disputes frequently involve statutory claims, especially
civil rights claims. Despite its general approval of arbitration for statutory
claims after 1985, however, the Court granted special protection to claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).32 A few
years earlier, the Court had unanimously held in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.," that anti-discrimination policy is of such high priority that
"there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII."' The Court viewed arbitration as "well suited to the resolution of con-
tractual disputes ... [but] inappropriate.., for the.., resolution of rights
created by Title VII. ' 35 The Court reasoned that arbitrators "effectuate the
intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted legislation," '36
24. Hai Jiang, Note, Do We Allow Contract Law to Administer Civil Rights Remedies?
Casenote on Haskins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 2003 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. - DETRorr C. L.
251, 254 (quoting 9 U.S.C § 2 (2000)).
25. 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (West 1999).
26. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 944 (1999).
27. Jiang, supra note 24, at 255.
28. Stone, supra note 26, at 943.
29. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
30. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
31. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Mit-
subishi was an international commercial law case, but it provided a strong signal that the
Court was now willing to allow arbitration of statutory claims. In addition, the Court made it
clear that arbitration was now a favored approach to dispute resolution: "[W]e are well past
the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution." Id. at 626-27.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1999 & Supp. 2003)
33. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
34. Id. at 51.
35. Id. at 56.
36. Id at 56-57. 5
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that arbitration produces a less complete record, does not employ the usual
rules of evidence or civil procedure, and does not require arbitrators to give
reasons for an award.37
In surprising contrast to this strong stand against arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims in 1974, in 1991 the Supreme Court ruled in
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,38 that an employee could be forced
to arbitrate an age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.39 In Gilmer, the court distinguished Gardner-Denver be-
cause the latter involved a collective bargaining agreement. ' The Court went
further, however, stating that Gardner-Denver reflected "[tihe view that
arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving statutory
claims... [a view that] has been undermined by our recent arbitration deci-
sions." 1 The Court concluded, "'by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 4
The tide had turned. Not only did the Court endorse mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, it was now willing to extend its approval to civil
rights claims arising out of employment disputes. The Gilmer decision was
narrow in its effect, however. The arbitration clause at issue was not in an
employment contract, but part of an application to register with the New
York Stock Exchange, which Gilmer was required by his employer to fill
out."3 The Court did not rule on the broader question of whether the FAA ap-
plied to employment contracts generally."
Why would the Court have to answer such a question? As discussed be-
low, the question was created in 1925, in the wording of the FAA itself. It
was only in 1991, however, that the question came to the forefront. Because
employment disputes so often involve statutory-and especially civil
rights--claims, and because the Gilmer Court had broadly embraced arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, it became important to know whether the FAA cov-
37. Id. at 57-58.
38. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
39. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003). It is of interest to note that the
Court in 1991 had only four members who had participated in the Gardner-Denver decision
(Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, Blackmun and White). The other members were new (Justices
Souter, Scalia, Stevens, Kennedy and O'Connor) and for the most part more conservative than
the justices they replaced. Supreme Court Historical Society, Timeline of the Justices, at
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02-history/subs-timeline/02_a.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2004); Supreme Court Historical Society, The Current Court, at http://www.supremecourt
history.org/02history/subscurrent/02_b.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
40. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
41. Id. at 34 n.5.
42. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
43. Id. at 23.
44. Edward A. Marshall, Title Vli's Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v. Ad-
ams: Making the Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 1 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 71, 80
(2003).
[Vol. 40
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ered employment contracts. Unfortunately, the text of the FAA contains no
clear answer to the question."5
B. The Question of Employment Contracts in the FAA
The FAA excludes some employment contracts from its coverage, but
does not make clear which ones. Excluded are "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce."* Just who are these other workers? The statute
does not tell us. This ambiguity has led to considerable conflict in the courts
in the wake of the Gilmer decision.
Why should employment contracts be different than any others? Those
who argue that employment contracts should be excluded from the FAA
point out that arbitration developed as an arrangement between merchants to
settle their disputes.47 Commercial arbitration agreements are voluntarily "ar-
rived at after arms length bargaining and a determination by each party that
the agreement is in its best interests.""8 In contrast, unequal bargaining power
permeates the employment relationship. '9 When a job is at stake, an agree-
ment to arbitrate is not the result of a bargained-for exchange. The employee
needs the job and is unlikely to challenge or even question the clause."
Moreover, the employee has little knowledge of the likelihood that he may
end up in a dispute with his new employer.5
The terms of the arbitration agreement are designed and controlled by
the employer, and are imposed unilaterally on the employee.52 Employers
may also benefit as "repeat players" in the arbitration process, where they
may have undue influence with the arbitrators who benefit from their con-
tinuing business. 3 Limits on discovery may hinder the employee in building
a case against his employer, and even if he prevails in arbitration, the reme-
dies available to him may be more limited than those provided by statute.'
For example, he may not be able to win punitive damages, attorney fees, or
reinstatement.55
45. Id. at 81-82.
46. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003) (emphasis added).
47. Jiang, supra note 24, at 273.
48. Martin H. Malin, Privatizing Justice-But by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not
Answer, 16 OHo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 589, 595 (2001).
49. Jiang, supra note 24, at 273.
50. Malin, supra note 48, at 596.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 598. An exception is the case of a highly paid executive, who is able to negoti-
ate the terms of his employment, including an agreement to arbitrate. Id. The vast majority of
employees, however, hold no such bargaining power.
53. Lisa Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 224 (1998).
54. Malin, supra note 48, at 599-600.
55. Id.
389
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Arbitrators are not bound to follow case precedent or statutes, and have
"wide latitude in their interpretation of laws." '56 Thus, the employee may
lose, even though he has the law on his side. If he loses, it is highly unlikely
that he will succeed in having the ruling vacated by a judge. The FAA re-
quires corruption, fraud, or misconduct in the arbitration process in order for
a court to vacate an arbitration award.-" Most courts have held that mere er-
rors of law are not sufficient to vacate an award. Instead, there must be
"manifest disregard of law," which generally requires a finding that the arbi-
trator "deliberately disregarded what [he] knew to be the law." '58 This stan-
dard is especially difficult to achieve because arbitrators are generally not
required to provide written explanations of their opinions.59
Because of these problems, many commentators have argued that em-
ployment agreements should not be subject to the FAA, and employees
should retain full access to the courts to resolve employment disputes.'
However, others argue that arbitration agreements are advantageous to em-
ployees. For example, one commentator points out that in a litigation-based
system, the only employees who reap lucrative jury verdicts or settlements
are those with high enough salaries to attract competent attorneys and to
withstand the costs and risks of a lawsuit.6 ' He argues that arbitration pro-
vides "accessible justice for average claimants... [who] will benefit [from]
lower costs... [and] a prompt resolution more suitable for claims by in-
cumbent employees or even former employees truly desiring reinstate-
ment."62 Others note that in arbitration there is generally no summary judg-
ment, so the employee will always be sure to have his case heard on the
merits. 3 The debate goes on, but in the meantime the Supreme Court stepped
56. Jiang, supra note 24, at 273.
57. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
58. Steven J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 724 (1999). See Moncharsh v. Heily & Blas6, 832 P.2d
899, 904, 919 (1992) ("[W]ith narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed
for errors of fact or law.... Further, the existence of an error of law apparent on the face of
the award that causes substantial injustice does not provide grounds for judicial review.").
59. Ware, supra note 58, at 721.
60. Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 281 (2002). Senator Feingold (D-Wis.) and Representative Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio)
have separately authored (unsuccessful) legislation to amend the FAA to exempt all employ-
ment contracts. Id. at 293-94. Compare Marshall, supra note 44, at 107 (advocating that Con-
gress provide protection from employer retaliation to employees covered by arbitration
agreements who seek to arbitrate a statutory claim) with David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Com-
pelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33 (calling on the courts to stop enforcing arbitration
contracts in employment) and Jiang, supra note 24, at 276-77 (advocating a heightened stan-
dard of judicial scrutiny in civil rights employment cases).
61. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001).
62. Id. See also Charity Robl, Recent Development: Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 219, 227 (2001) (making many of the same arguments).
63. Malin, supra note 48, at 609.
[Vol. 40
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up to the plate in 2001, and decided what the FAA meant by its exclusion of
"any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 6
C. Circuit City Stores v. Adams
By 2001, all of the federal courts of appeal had interpreted the FAA's
statement of exclusion in narrow terms, and held that the FAA applied to
most employment contracts-all, that is, except the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.' Moreover, the other federal courts saw nothing in the "text, legis-
lative history, or purposes underlying Title VII mandating an exception for
the civil rights statute."" Only the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA's exclu-
sion of employment contracts of "any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce" meant that all contracts of employment fell
outside the scope of the statute.67 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,8 the
Supreme Court, in a five to four ruling, reversed the Ninth Circuit and held
that "Section 1 [of the FAA] exempts.., only contracts of employment of
transportation workers."' The Court did not specifically address the issue of
a Title VII exception, because the case before it involved claims brought un-
der California law. The following year the Court reaffirmed its ruling in a
Title VII case, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.7" In this case, all nine justices
endorsed the idea that the FAA applies to employment contracts.7 However,
the majority also held that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was free to pursue a claim on behalf of an individual, despite the
existence of an arbitration agreement." This ruling will have limited effect
on employment disputes, considering that the EEOC brings suit in a very
small number of cases each year." However, the EEOC's ability to pursue
statutory claims notwithstanding an arbitration clause has important implica-
tions for the California Labor Commission, as shown below.
64. Marshall, supra note 44, at 80-81 (quoting 9 U.S.C § 1 (1999)).
65. Id. at 72.
66. Id.
67. Id. See also Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
68. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
69. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
70. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
71. Peak, supra note 21, at 1250. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged this
reality in September 2003, when it reheard en banc a case decided in 2002. On rehearing, the
court reaffirmed its earlier holding that Duffield was overruled, and that arbitration clauses
cannot be barred in Title VII employment cases. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
72. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297-98.
73. Peak, supra note 21, at 1250. 9
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III. LAW
As a result of Circuit City, Waffle House, and earlier decisions holding
that the FAA preempts state law, 4 states can no longer declare the FAA in-
applicable to employment contracts, even where statutory claims are in-
volved." An arbitration clause can be challenged only under general state
contract law doctrines,76 in particular the doctrine of unconscionability.7 "
This is what happened in Circuit City v. Adams on remand (Adams III),78
where the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable,
because its terms were unconscionable."' Thus, state contract law provides a
means of challenging arbitration clauses on a case-by-case basis. However,
the unconscionability standard is traditionally difficult to meet, and some
commentators argue that it will apply only to the most egregious cases.'
Nevertheless, state courts have made use of the concept in developing guide-
lines for evaluating arbitration clauses.
The California Supreme Court provided guidelines for its lower courts
to follow in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc." In
this case, the plaintiff brought a claim for wrongful termination against her
employer under the Fair Employment and Housing Act of California
(FEHA),8 which is the state analogue to a Title VII claim. 3 The employer
sued to compel arbitration, based on a mandatory agreement signed by the
plaintiff." The court found the arbitration clause unconscionable because it
required the employee, but not the employer, to arbitrate disputes," and be-
cause it provided for limited damages and remedies. The court considered
whether the offending provisions could be severed and the remainder of the
74. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
75. Plourde, supra note 12, at 171-72.
76. "The principles of contract law ... require courts to enforce any arbitration contract
unless there is a showing of fraud, duress, mistake, or other misconduct .. " Jiang, supra
note 24, at 277.
77. Under California Civil Code § 1670.5, a court can refuse to enforce a contract provi-
sion which is unconscionable. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1670.5 (West 2003). Determining uncon-
scionability involves a two-prong test: 1) procedural unconscionability (oppression or surprise
due to unequal bargaining power) and 2) substantive unconscionability (harsh or one-sided
results). Both must be present (though not in the same degree) in order for a court to void a
provision or an entire contract. Arnendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 690 (2000).
78. Circuit City v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889 (2002).
79. Plourde, supra note 12, at 172-73 (discussing Circuit City).
80. Id. at 175.
81. 6 P.3d 669 (2000).
82. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004).
83. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 674.
84. Id. at 675.
85. Id. at 692.
86. Id. at 694.
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contract enforced. It concluded that the lack of mutuality was not severable:
the contract was "permeated by unconscionability," and was thus invalid.88
In its opinion, the California Supreme Court stated six requirements for
a valid arbitration clause, based on contract law principles." An agreement
that requires an employee to arbitrate statutory claims: 1) cannot limit an
employee's statutory damages; 2) must allow the full range of discovery,
unless there is an express agreement to the contrary; 3) must provide for a
written arbitration decision to allow for judicial review; 4) must require a
neutral arbitrator; 5) cannot require the employee to pay any expense that is
unique to arbitration; and 6) must apply to the employer as well as the em-
ployee.'
The focus on statutory claims reflects the California Supreme Court's
concern that employers might use arbitration agreements to contract out of
their statutory obligations. The court quoted dicta from the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc.,9" pointing out that when a party agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim, it
"'does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute [but] only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.'"
'
Noting that this point is prescriptive as well as descriptive, the Armendariz
court declared, "[I]t sets a standard by which arbitration agreements... are
to be measured, and disallows forms of arbitration that in fact compel claim-
ants to forfeit certain substantive statutory rights." 3 The court stated that
statutory rights created for a public purpose rather than for individual benefit
cannot be waived and concluded, "An arbitration agreement cannot be made
to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the
Thus, the California Supreme Court made clear in Armendariz that,
while it endorses the concept that the FAA applies to employment contracts
and to statutory claims, it intends to apply close scrutiny to the arbitration
clauses in those contracts." Recent California and Ninth Circuit cases have
reaffirmed and extended Armendariz principles.96
87. Id. at 695-99.
88. Id. at 698.
89. Bernard Finnegan, Note, The California Supreme Court Framework for Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements: Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 36
U.S.F. L. REv. 571, 578-82 (2002).
90. Id.
91. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
92. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 679 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628).
93. Id. at 680.
94. Id at681.
95. Id. at 679.
96. Mercuro v. Countrywide Secs. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (2002); Little v. Auto
Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979 (2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.
2003). 11
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In Mercuro v. Countrywide Securities Corp.,9 the Second District of the
California Court of Appeal expanded the reach of Armendariz, declaring,
"A rmendariz's 'particular scrutiny' of arbitration agreements should [not] be
confined to claims under FEHA. Rather... such scrutiny should apply to the
enforcement of rights under any statute enacted 'for a public reason.'""n The
court held that Armendariz principles therefore applied to claims brought
under the California Labor Code as well."
In 2003, the California Supreme Court further broadened the reach of
Armendariz in Little v. Auto Steigler." The court extended Annendariz pro-
tections to cover a non-statutory employment claim: a Tameny claim for
termination "in violation of public policy.''. The court reasoned that em-
ployees' public policy rights are as strong as statutory rights, and should
therefore fall under Arnendariz as well."
Most recently, in Ingle v. Circuit City, 3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals declared that an arbitration clause in an employment contract "raises a
rebuttable presumption of substantive unconscionability."' "Unless the em-
ployer can demonstrate that the effect of a contract to arbitrate is bilateral...
with respect to a particular employee, courts should presume such contracts
substantively unconscionable."'" This means that employers will be required
to make an initial showing that the duties, obligations and benefits of the
agreement affect the employer and employee equally."o
This is a holding of potentially broad scope, as it appears to apply Ar-
mendariz to all arbitration clauses in employment contracts, and to all types
of claims."° Moreover, Armendariz implied that mandatory arbitration
agreements in employment contracts are per se procedurally unconscionable,
because they are "imposed on employees as a condition of employment...
[with] no opportunity to negotiate."'' 8 Add to this Ingle's rebuttable pre-
97. 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (2002).
98. Id. at 680 (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669, 680 (Cal. 2000)).
99. Id.
100. 63 P.3d 979 (2003).
101. Id. at 987 (citing Tameny v. At. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Cal. 1980)).
102. Id.
103. 328 F.3d 1167 (2003).
104. Id. at 1174.
105. Id.
106. Wendy Lazerson, et al., California Employment Alert: An Obstacle to Arbitration
Agreements, at www.gsy.fi/Publications/newsletters.asp?I-D=373 (May 15, 2003).
107. Ingle involved claims brought under FEHA and Title VII, but the court did not limit
its conclusion to statutory claims. It appeared, rather, to be making a general statement about
arbitration contracts between employers and employees, regardless of the type of claim in-
volved.
108. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (2000). The
court actually stated that the arbitration agreement before it was a contract of adhesion, which
it appeared to equate with procedural unconscionability. ld. In Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997), the court noted that procedural unconscionability turns on adhesive-
ness: "the threshold question is whether the.., arbitration clause is part of a contract of ad-
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sumption of substantive unconscionability, and the unconscionability stan-
dard may not be so difficult to meet after all. Employers may now be facing
an uphill battle when they seek to compel arbitration in California courts.
Armendariz and its progeny show that the California (and Ninth Circuit)
courts are prepared to closely scrutinize arbitration clauses in employment
contracts whenever they come before them. Following the Armendariz
guidelines, the courts have declared many such agreements unconscionable
and void when employers have sought to compel arbitration."°9 Even in cases
where the employee was highly skilled or in management, and presumably
had more bargaining power than the average worker, the courts have found
arbitration agreements unconscionable."0
In some cases where the arbitration agreement was enforced, one clause
was nevertheless severed as unconscionable."' In only a few cases has the
arbitration agreement been enforced in its entirety."'
Thus, while Circuit City and Waffle House declared arbitration clauses
in employment contracts legal and binding, the California (and Ninth Cir-
cuit) courts appear more likely than not to find these agreements uncon-
scionable. These courts recognize the inherently unequal nature of arbitra-
tion agreements in the employment context, and rightly scrutinize the
agreements closely for fairness. This works to the benefit of the employees
in these cases. However, as long as the fairness of arbitration agreements is
hesion, thereby establishing the necessary element of procedural unconscionability." Id. at
145-46. The Ninth Circuit in Ingle read Armendariz to hold that "it is procedurally uncon-
scionable to require employees, as a condition of employment, to waive their right to seek re-
dress of grievances in a judicial forum." Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172.
109. In addition to Armendariz and Mercuro, the California courts have held that arbitra-
tion contracts were unconscionable and thus void in Gonzalez v. Hughes Aircraft Employees
Fed. Credit Union, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (1999); Kinney v. United Health Care Servs., Inc., 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (1999); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997) (the preced-
ing three cases predated Armendariz and were relied on in part in that opinion); Pitzen v.
Veritas Software, No. A100181, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8259 (Aug. 29, 2003);
O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (2003); Wilson v. Bally Total Fit-
ness, No. D039355, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5892 (June 18, 2003); Hendrix v. Coun-
trywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B153848, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6598 (July 17,
2002); and Packin v. Astra USA, Inc., No. G023345, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4483
(Jan. 29, 2002). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held arbitration agreements uncon-
scionable in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (2003); Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (2002); and Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298
F.3d 778 (2002).
110. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (1997) (Stirlen was vice-president
and chief financial officer of Supercuts, yet the arbitration agreement between them was
found to be unconscionable); Graham v. Scissor-Tall, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (arbitra-
tion agreement enforced between concert promoter and the musical group that hired him, but
one clause found unconscionable and severed).
111. See generally Graham, 623 P.2d 165, on which Armendariz relied in part; Ingle v.
Circuit City, 328 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2003); McManus v. CIBC World Markets, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 446 (2003).
112. Kim v. Sonic Auto., Inc., No. H024386, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6516
(2003); Martinez v. Univision Television Group, No. A 100780, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEX-
IS 6227 (2003). 13
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determined on a case-by-case basis, the courts' position will be of limited
impact."3
A. The California Labor Code and Labor Commission
The cases cited above involved employees who filed suit in Superior
Court, after which their employers moved to compel arbitration. However,
many employees take their complaints to the California Labor Commission,
rather than to court. The California Labor Code establishes the right of em-
ployees to take complaints of violations of the Code either to Superior Court
or to the Labor Commission."' The Labor Code covers all employees of pri-
vate employers in California,"' regardless of their immigration status."6
The California Labor Commission is part of the Department of Labor
Standards and Enforcement (DLSE), which is under the Department of In-
dustrial Relations."7 The DLSE enforces wage and labor standards and all
labor laws not specifically delegated to another agency (e.g., Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Administration, Division of Occupational Safety and
Health, or Division of Workers' Compensation). 8
The Labor Commission has been hearing cases since the turn of the
twentieth century."9 However, legislation in 1976 created the modern form
of the Labor Commission. Wage and hour claims are now heard in a
"Berman" hearing, named after then-assemblyman Howard Berman, who in-
troduced the legislation creating it.' It is designed to protect the statutory
rights of workers, to "provide a speedy, informal, and affordable method of
resolving wage claims" and "to avoid recourse to costly and time-consuming
judicial proceedings."'' There is no charge to either party unless they desire
counsel, which they arrange for on their own.'
113. The case-by-case approach may affect more than just the parties involved. Court
decisions are publicized and both employers and employees may be aware of them and shape
their behavior accordingly. Nevertheless, a case-by-case approach cannot have the broad im-
pact that a statewide or national policy could achieve.
114. CAL. LAB. CODE § 218 (West 2003).
115. Some categories of workers are not covered by the Labor Code: independent con-
tractors; volunteers; trainees; and executive, administrative and professional employees.
However, the Labor Code has rigorous standards for determining whether an employee falls
into one of these categories. LEGAL AID Soc'Y EM'. LAW CTR., supra note 6, at 11-18. The
burden of proof is on the employer who claims such an exemption. Id. at 15 (citing Ramirez
v. Yosemite Water Co., 978 P.2d 2, 8 (1999); Norquist v. McGraw Hill Broad. Co., 38 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 221, 225-26 (1995)).
116. LEGAL AID Soc'Y EMP. LAW CTR., supra note 6, at 11.
117. DEP'T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (Sept. 2003) (on file with
author).
118. Id.
119. Telephone Interview with Miles Locker, Senior Counsel, California Labor Commis-
sion (Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Locker Interview II].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Lolley v. Campbell, 48 P.3d 1128, 1130 (Cal. 2002) (quoting Cuadra v. Millan, 952
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The Labor Commission represents a powerful resource for workers, and
many make good use of it. Since 1976, workers have filed approximately
50,000 wage and hour claims each year.'2 The Labor Commission requires
the parties to meet for a settlement conference before proceeding to a hear-
ing, and most claims are settled there or soon after." Approximately 16,000
claims go to a Berman hearing each year; 70% of those are decided in favor
of the employee.'26 Employers file appeals in Superior Court in about 1,000
of those cases, and the Labor Commission typically represents the employee
at the appeal.'27 The original decision is affirmed by the Superior Court in
approximately 90% of the appeals.'28
Since 1986, the Labor Commission has also had the authority, under
California Labor Code section 98.7, to investigate and resolve employee
complaints of discrimination arising under various sections of the Labor
Code.'29 These relate primarily to retaliation by the employer when the em-
ployee exercises his rights under the Labor Code. 3 The Labor Commis-
sioner was originally charged with enforcing nine Labor Code statutes, and
by 2001, the number had increased to twenty-eight. 3 ' In 2001, 1003 such
complaints were filed, 60% of which were for retaliation or discrimination
against an employee as a result of "filing or intent to file a claim with the
Labor Commissioner."'3 The next largest group of claims (15%) alleged dis-
crimination due to reporting safety and health violations at the workplace.'33
Seven hundred ninety-nine cases were closed in 2001." Of these, 50 were
decided in favor of the complainant, 98 were settled to the mutual satisfac-
tion of both parties, 172 were dismissed, and the remaining 479 were with-
drawn or abandoned by the complainant.'35
P.2d 704, 706 (1998)).
123. The only exception to the no-charge policy is that the Labor Commissioner may
assess reasonable attorney's fees against a complainant where a discrimination complaint is
found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, groundless, and brought in bad faith" and where the
complaint has been dismissed after a hearing by the Labor Commissioner. CAL. LAB. CODE §
98.7(d)(1) (West 2003).
124. Locker Interview II, supra note 119.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. ARTHUR S. LUJAN, Div. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, 2001
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT REPORT, http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/2001DiscriminationCom-
plaintReport.htm (Mar. 5, 2002).
130. See supra note 9 for examples.
131. LUJAN, supra note 129. "[Tlhe majority of these statutes are contained in the Labor
Code ... but the [DLSE] also enforces statutes contained in the Health and Welfare Code, the
Unemployment Insurance Code, and the Industrial Welfare Commission Orders." Id.
132. Id. This is prohibited by CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 2003).
133. LUJAN, supra note 129.
134. Id.
135. Id. 15
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A centralized Discrimination Complaint Investigation Unit with thirteen
full-time Deputy Labor Commissioners, well-trained in investigation and re-
port writing and knowledgeable about the relevant statutes, handles dis-
crimination complaints."6 Similarly, the Deputy Labor Commissioners who
handle wage and hours claims at eighteen statewide offices are full-time em-
ployees, and are well versed in the statutes under which complaints arise.'37
The strong protections provided by the DLSE to workers are especially
important in the context of at-will employment, in which employers are free
to hire and fire for any reason, or for no reason.' It has long been recog-
nized that the employer-employee relationship is inherently unequal,'39 and
laws and administrative proceedings that protect workers help to partially
offset their weaker position vis-A-vis their employers. The Labor Commis-
sion, with its highly trained staff dedicated solely to enforcing the Labor
Code, is a valuable part of the protections enjoyed by California workers.'"
B. Labor Commission Cases Involving Arbitration Agreements
One of the protections contained in the Labor Code is section 229,
which provides, "Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the col-
lection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be main-
tained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate." 
14
Notwithstanding the position of the U.S. Supreme Court that the FAA
extends to most employee contracts and preempts state law, the California
Labor Commissioner has taken an assertive stance regarding arbitration
clauses. Senior Counsel Miles Locker states, "DLSE will not halt proceed-
ings on a wage claim in response to an employer's assertion that the claim is
covered by an arbitration 'agreement.""' 2 If an employer wants to halt the
136. Id.
137. CAL. LAB. CODE § 81 (West 2003). See generally Div. of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment, District Offices, at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DistrictOffices.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2004).
138. 4 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 130.02 (Matthew Bender) (2003). "Outside of
the discrimination laws... there is simply no general statutory law which alters this basic rule
[of at-will employment]." Id.
139. Jiang, supra note 24, at 273.
140. The DLSE sees its mission as serving employers as well: "to protect employers who
comply with the law from those who attempt to gain competitive advantage at the expense of
their workers by failing to comply with minimum labor standards." Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement, Homepage, at http://www.dir.ca.gov/DLSE/dlse.htmil (last visited Feb. 22,
2004).
141. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2003).
142. E-mail from Miles Locker, Senior Counsel, California Labor Commission, to em-
ployer representative (Feb. 19, 2002), quoted in John M. True, Point of View: Some Recent-
and Surprising-Developments in Mandatory Employment Arbitration, at www.leonard
carder.com/articles/RecentArbitrationDevelopments.htm (last modified Feb. 22, 2004).
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proceeding, he must file a motion to compel arbitration in Superior Court.
14 3
The court will examine the arbitration agreement under Armendariz guide-
lines. If the court finds the agreement unconscionable, it will deny the mo-
tion to compel arbitration, after which the employer is free to appeal.'" The
Labor Commission typically intervenes on behalf of the employee in the
court proceeding, just as it does in other court proceedings pursuant to sec-
tion 98 of the Labor Code."5 Given the close scrutiny the California courts
apply to these arbitration agreements, and the rigorous standards required by
Armendariz, it is by no means certain that the employer will succeed in his
motion to compel arbitration. While the DLSE does not collect data on the
outcome of these motions, according to Locker, there have been an increas-
ing number of such motions in recent years.'" He estimates that in seventy-
five percent of these cases, the court has found the arbitration agreement un-
conscionable and denied the motion."7
The Labor Commission proceeding continues throughout this time, and
only in the face of an order to compel arbitration will the Labor Commis-
sioner halt it. Thus, the Labor Commission has made clear its view that Cali-
fornia workers have the right to their "day in court," albeit an administrative
court, whether or not they have signed an agreement to arbitrate.
How have the courts responded to this position? The answer is mixed,
and this area of law is still evolving. There are only a few cases that have
gone up on appeal. As far back as 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in
Perry v. Thomas'" that the FAA preempts section 229 of the California La-
bor Code.'" This case involved an employee who took his claim to court,
however, rather than to the Labor Commission." This ruling predated Cir-
cuit City, so the Court had yet to make it clear that the FAA was to apply to
nearly all employment contracts.
A few years later, the California Court of Appeal addressed the validity
of an arbitration clause in a Labor Commission case, Baker v. Aubry." As in
Perry, the court held that the FAA preempted the California Labor Code,
and that arbitration did not deprive appellant of her substantive rights under
the Code." This case was unique, however, in that it involved an arbitration
agreement signed not with the employer, but with the New York Stock Ex-
143. Interview with Michael Jackman, supra note 3.
144. Id.
145. Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.2 - 98.7 (West 2003).
146. Telephone Interview with Michael Locker, Senior Counsel, California Labor Com-
mission (Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Locker Interview I].
147. Id.
148. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
149. Id. at 490-91. Section 229 is the anti-arbitration statement in the California Labor
Code. The Court reasoned that because this statement is in direct conflict with the FAA, the
state statute must defer. Id.
150. Id. at 484.
151. 265 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1989).
152. Id. at 385. 17
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change (NYSE).'53 Commonly known as "U-4's," these agreements are re-
quired of all employees who register with the NYSE or National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD)." There is a long line of cases involving U-4
agreements,'55 and while they have generally been upheld as binding the em-
ployee to arbitrate disputes with the employer,'56 they are not, strictly speak-
ing, employer-employee agreements. Moreover, "[a]fter many challenges
against the arbitration of civil rights claims, the NYSE and NASD amended
the rules. As of January 1, 1999, statutory employment-related discrimina-
tion claims are arbitrable only if the parties agree to arbitration after the dis-
pute has arisen. '57 Therefore, Baker, like Perry, is not strictly applicable to
Labor Commission cases today.
Livadas v. Bradshaw'8 is another case in a class by itself. The Labor
Commission refused to take this case because the employee was covered by
a collective bargaining agreement. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the employee could proceed with her Labor Commission claim because
it was outside the scope of her collective bargaining agreement.'59 Livadas is
one of a line of cases that have held that employees under collective bargain-
ing agreements (which typically contain arbitration clauses) may pursue
statutory employment disputes in court or other tribunals."w It is ironic that
the workers who already have all the protections and benefits of a union con-
tract are able to bypass arbitration to claim their statutory rights, while the
least protected employees cannot do the same. 6'
153. Id. at 382. This case is also unique in that claimant was suing the Labor Commis-
sion under a writ of mandate to compel it to adjudicate her claim. This was prior to the Labor
Commission's current stance on arbitration agreements. The Commissioner declined jurisdic-
tion because of the arbitration agreement. Id.
154. Jiang, supra note 24, at 253.
155. See id. for a discussion of several U-4 cases. Perry v. Thomas was itself a U-4 case.
482 U.S. 483 (1987).
156. Jiang, supra note 24, at 251.
157. Id. at 254.
158. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
159. Id. at 124-25. Livadas' claim was brought under California Labor Code section 203,
which requires immediate payment of all wages owed upon severance of employment. This
was an issue not covered in the collective bargaining agreement between her union and her
employer. Id.
160. Id. at 123-24. The Court's rationale in these cases is that because the arbitration
agreement is not entered into directly by the employee, but is part of a collective bargaining
agreement, the employee cannot thereby be deprived of his statutory rights. Id. In addition,
labor arbitrators have no authority to adjudicate statutory claims. Id. at 128 n.21 (citing Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 53-54 (1974)). In Livadas, the Court also argued that
to deny the union member the right to pursue statutory claims elsewhere is to force the mem-
ber to choose between belonging to a union and protecting her statutory rights. Id. at 117. As
such, it violates the intent of the National Labor Relations Act, which guarantees workers the
right to bargain collectively. Id.
161. Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitration of State-Law Claims by Employees: An Ar-
gument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 1695, 1746-49 (1995).
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The first case directly on point is FirstAmerica Automotive, Inc. v.
Sweeney.62 This 2000 case both pre-dated and presaged Circuit City. Here,
the California Court of Appeal chose not to follow the Ninth Circuit's posi-
tion, expressed in Craft v. Campbell Soup, Co.,63 that the FAA excluded
most employment contracts.'" The Sweeney court held that the FAA did not
exclude a car salesman from coverage, and therefore the FAA applied to his
case and preempted section 229 of the California Labor Code. 65 Sweeney
was therefore unable to pursue his claim for unpaid wages with the Labor
Commissioner.'"
Whether arbitration agreements can be enforced in Labor Commission
cases seems to have been answered once and for all in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams,67 and the answer seems to undermine the position of the La-
bor Commissioner. In Circuit City, the Court decreed that most employment
contracts fall within the scope of the FAA,'" and that the FAA preempts
contrary state law.'" Thus, it would seem that an employee who has signed
an arbitration clause is now barred from bringing a claim under the Califor-
nia Labor Code to the Labor Commission (or to court).
However, as discussed earlier, the situation is made more complex by
the fact that arbitration agreements are subject to state contract law and the
doctrine of unconscionability' 0 The court held in Mercuro v. Countrywide
Securities Corp. ' that the arbitration agreement signed by Mr. Mercuro
could not be enforced because its terms were unconscionable under Armen-
dariz." Mercuro's claims were brought under FEHA and the California La-
bor Code.' While he pursued his claims in court, he could have brought the
Labor Code claims to the Labor Commission. Had he done so, the court's
ruling would have allowed him to pursue his Labor Commission claim.
Thus, while an arbitration agreement theoretically trumps an employee's
right to take a claim to the Labor Commissioner (or to court), the employer
will often fail when it tries to compel arbitration, because the agreement is
held unconscionable under Armendariz. This means that, while in theory,
Circuit City overrules the Labor Commissioner's refusal to honor arbitration
clauses, in practice the Labor Commissioner may prevail after all.'
162. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623 (Ct. App. 2000).
163. 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998).
164. Sweeney, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625.
165. id.
166. Id.
167. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
168. Id. at 119.
169. Id. at 121-22.
170. See supra notes 74-113 and accompanying text.
171. ll6Cal. Rptr. 2d671 (2002).
172. Id. at 680, 682.
173. Id. at 679. The California Labor Code claims were brought under sections 230.8 and
970. Id. at 680.
174. The California Labor Commission has seen an increasing number of its cases go to 19
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C. Labor Commission Discrimination Claims
Mr. Mercuro's Labor Code claims were actually discrimination claims,
not wage claims."' When an employee files a discrimination claim with the
Labor Commission, he hands the claim over to the Labor Commission for
investigation and a decision, rather than going directly against his em-
ployer.'76 Here, the Labor Commission is in a position similar to that of the
EEOC in Waffle House.' The Labor Commission argues that like the
EEOC, it is a third party and can pursue victim-specific relief, notwithstand-
ing an arbitration agreement.' Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Massey,'79 is a Labor
Commission discrimination case currently on appeal in the Fourth District
Court of California. At trial, the employer moved to prevent the Labor
Commission from investigating and to compel arbitration.' The trial judge
denied the motion, agreeing with the Labor Commission that it held third
party status and could pursue its investigation on behalf of Mr. Massey.'
Ralph's is now appealing the ruling, arguing that the Labor Commission is
not a third party, but an agent of Massey.'
The Labor Commission appears to be on strong legal ground here, with
Waffle House as precedent. If it can establish that it is acting as a third party
in discrimination cases, it will be able to pursue claims on behalf of individ-
ual claimants, notwithstanding an arbitration agreement. Rather than relying
on the likelihood that an arbitration agreement will be held unconscionable,
as it must in wage claims, the Labor Commission could proceed with a dis-
crimination case with greater certainty and efficiency.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Despite the California courts' willingness to void unfair arbitration
agreements in employment contracts, this is not an adequate solution to
those who see mandatory arbitration as unfair in the employment context.
court in recent years on the employer's motion to compel arbitration. Locker Interview I, su-
pra note 146. The motions to compel arbitration are denied in approximately seventy-five
percent of these cases because the arbitration agreement is held to be unconscionable. Id.
175. Mercuro v. Countrywide Secs. Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 685 (2002). Mr. Mer-
curo filed claims under California Labor Code section 230.8, which prohibits an employer
from discriminating against workers for taking time off to participate in their children's
school activities; and section 970, which prohibits employers from fraudulently inducing a
person to change residences to take a job, by misrepresenting the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. Id. at 680.
176. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.7 (West 2003).
177. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
178. Id. at 297.
179. No. D042249 (4th Dist. Ct. App. filed May 23, 2003).
180. Interview with Michael Jackman, supra note 3.
181. Ralph's Grocery Co. v. Kelvin Massey, No. G.I.C. 805279 (Sup. Ct., San Diego
County, California filed Apr. 22, 2003).
182. Ralph's, No. D042249.
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For every plaintiff who asserts the right to take an employment claim to
court or to the Labor Commission, there are no doubt many more who do
not, even though they may have signed an unconscionable arbitration
agreement. Many will not know that their arbitration agreement is uncon-
scionable, because the only way to be sure is to have it tested in court. Many
will believe their employer who tells them they have no choice but to arbi-
trate an employment dispute.
In addition, the current situation actually creates a new source of litiga-
tion-a "race to the courthouse"'183 to determine whether the claimant has the
right to take his claim to the Labor Commission or to court, or whether he
must submit it to arbitration. To the extent that the FAA was designed to re-
duce courthouse congestion, this trend in employment law is counterproduc-
tive.
A new development in this area is the legal theory currently being pro-
posed by attorneys at the Labor Commission." ' They are taking a proactive
stance with regard to their rights to take claims in the face of an arbitration
agreement. Their position is:
1. Under Armendariz, employees cannot be required to give up their
substantive rights. By taking away their right to have an administrative
agency resolve their employment dispute, forcing arbitration amounts to a
loss of substantive rights.'85
2. The FAA was not intended to, and does not, state that it preempts the
right to an administrative hearing.'86
3. In order for an arbitration agreement in California to comport with
Arnendariz, it should contain a provision granting the employee the right to
proceed first to the Labor Commission to resolve any dispute that falls under
its jurisdiction. If the employer wants to appeal the decision of the Labor
Commission, it must post an appeal bond equal to the amount of the disputed
award (as currently provided for in the California Labor Code"). In this
case, however, arbitration-rather than Superior Court-would become the
appeal forum. 8
This theory is still being developed and has yet to be tested in court.
However, if successful, it would establish the Labor Commission's right to
proceed with any claim within its jurisdiction, notwithstanding the existence
of an arbitration agreement. If an arbitration agreement existed, it would
serve as an appeals forum. This would eliminate the case-by-case approach
of testing the validity of each arbitration agreement. With this theory, the
Labor Commission is attempting to establish that administrative proceedings
183. Interview with Michal Belknap, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law, in San Diego, Cal. (Sept. 23, 2003).
184. Locker Interview II, supra note 119.
185. id.
186. Id.
187. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.2(b) (West 2003).
188. Locker Interview II, supra note 119. 21
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are not the same as judicial proceedings, and should be treated differently in
resolving questions about arbitration of employment disputes.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the FAA preempts state
employment law, and that when a valid arbitration agreement exists, it must
be honored, even in statutory claims."9 Disagree as one may with these rul-
ings, they do not appear likely to be reversed in the near future. However, as
we have seen, the question is not as fully settled as it may at first appear.
Even with judicial claims, employees are able to take a "back-door" route,
by going to court, forcing the employer to move to compel arbitration, and in
many cases having the arbitration agreement declared void.
Similarly, with Labor Commission claims, the employee may take a
"back-door" route by going directly to the Labor Commission. In addition,
the Labor Commission now argues that because it is an administrative fo-
rum, it is in a class by itself, similar to employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements. As such, its cases warrant different treatment by the
FAA. There are some strong arguments to be made in support of this posi-
tion.
The Labor Commission's administrative proceeding is a non-judicial fo-
rum, which shares many of the advantages of arbitration. Administrative
proceedings are faster and lower in cost to all parties than court proceed-
ings." In fact, many cases are resolved at pre-hearing settlement confer-
ences, which makes the process even more efficient and conciliatory than
arbitration. 9'
More importantly, Labor Commission Hearing Officers are extremely
familiar with the relevant law and handle employment cases full-time.'" In
addition, Labor Commission rulings are subject to de novo judicial review.'93
These facts stand in sharp contrast to arbitration, where the arbitrator is
likely to be less familiar with California employment law, is not bound to
apply the law, and where appeals are strictly limited."'
The Labor Commission represents a valuable resource for employees,
protecting their statutory rights and providing an efficient avenue for redress
of their grievances. To preempt its authority undermines the fairness of so-
cial policy. An arbitration clause should not be allowed to stand between
employees and their right to pursue claims with the Labor Commission.
189. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); EEOC v. Waffle House,
Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
190. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
191. LEGAL AID Soc'Y EMP. LAW CTR., supra note 6, at 56.
192. CAL. LAB. CODE § 81 (West 2003).
193. Id. § 98.2(a).
194. See supra Part II.B.
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V. CONCLUSION
Employees should not be forced to sign away their right to take a claim
to the Labor Commission in order to obtain a job. The protections provided
by the Labor Code and enforced by the Labor Commission were hard won,
and should not be tossed aside.
In addition, employees should not have to rely on the courts to scruti-
nize arbitration clauses for unfairness. Many of these agreements are uncon-
scionable in their terms, yet few will be tested in court. Many employees
will not know that they have the right to challenge the arbitration agreement,
and will assume that their employer is correct when he tells them that they
have no choice but to proceed to arbitration. This can mean that arbitration
will occur based on an illegal agreement to arbitrate. The employer will have
succeeded in contracting out of his statutory obligations, evading the scru-
tiny of Armendariz.
When an arbitration clause is tested in court, it will frequently be found
unconscionable under Armendariz, and the employee's statutory rights will
be protected. However, this also means that one of the key purposes of arbi-
tration has been defeated. Instead of shrinking the court docket, the arbitra-
tion clause has expanded it. Where there would have been one court
proceeding over the claim, now there are two: one to test the arbitration
clause, and if it is voided, another to try the claim. Even if the clause is
found valid, the court docket has not been reduced: a court case on the claim
has been replaced with a court case on the arbitration clause. Similarly, with
a Labor Commission claim, an arbitration clause increases the use of court
rooms, rather than decreases it.
Society is served by protecting employee's rights, and by striving to
mitigate the inherently unequal relationship between employee and em-
ployer. Mandatory arbitration clauses do not do so, especially when they bar
employee access to the Labor Commission-the very agency dedicated to
protecting those rights.
The Labor Commission has so far been forced to take a "back-door" ap-
proach to upholding a claimant's right to pursue his claim in spite of an arbi-
tration clause. This is often effective for an individual claimant, but ulti-
mately insufficient as a broad solution to the problem. The Commissioner's
new legal theory is an attempt to move from the "back-door" to the "front-
door," with a policy that exempts administrative proceedings from the FAA
altogether. Is it likely to succeed? The California courts may respond fa-
vorably to the argument, based as it is on Armendariz's insistence on
protecting the statutory rights of employees. However, if the Labor Commis-
sion's new approach is successful in individual cases, it will ultimately be
tested on appeal, where the outcome is less certain. If the theory makes its
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, it is not likely to find a friendly reception.
The Court's recent positions on the FAA indicate that it favors arbitration in
nearly every context, and will oppose any obstacles to it.
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Ultimately, an act of Congress would probably be required to exempt
administrative proceedings from the FAA. In recent years, Democratic
members of Congress have introduced legislation exempting employment
contracts altogether from the FAA, or at least barring mandatory arbitration
of statutory claims for workers.'9 These attempts were unsuccessful. How-
ever, a proposal to exempt administrative proceedings from the FAA is
much less sweeping in its scope. Because it is narrower, and because a good
argument can be made that administrative proceedings offer both efficiency
and protection of workers' statutory rights, such a proposal may stand a bet-
ter chance of success.
Whatever the outcome, it seems safe to say that Circuit City and Waffle
House have not given us the final word on arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. In California, at least, any such thought is premature.
Judith S. Mcllwee"
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